Tesis doctoral de JÁ¶rg Franke
The thesis has a cumulative structure, i.E., It consists of four independent research papers. in the first chapter a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and high effort exertion does not exist. Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives in this contest game. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy. The second part is based on field experiments. It is closely related to the first part as the theoretical results derived there are tested in an experimental framework. Additionally, the underlying research question is extended because also the consequences of different types and sizes of affirmative action policies on incentives are analyzed. The experiments consist in several pairwise tournaments among school children from two different schools that compete against each other based on a real effort task (solving simple sudokus). The important difference between children is the ex-ante experience with this task that differs systematically between the two schools. This difference in experience is interpreted as an exogenous source of heterogeneity. Different affirmative action policies are implemented that balance this asymmetry and its consequences for performance are analyzed. The experimental data confirms that affirmative action does not result in a significant decline in performance. This result is robust with respect to different information structures, as well as different types and degrees of the affirmative action policy. Moreover there is evidence that (at least for non-experienced subjects) affirmative action has performance-enhancing effects. the third part analyzes the consequences of a parametrized class of sharing rules on the propensity of individuals to sabotage each other in a cooperative production framework. The considered sharing rules differ in their sensitivity to relative input contributions which has an impact not only on equilibrium provision of individual labor (that increases the respective individual input contribution) but also on the propensity to sabotage others (which decreases the input contributions of sabotaged individuals). Necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium where zero sabotage is the optimal equilibrium strategy are derived that depend on the sensitivity parameter of the sharing rule. It can be shown that sharing rules that are highly sensitive to differences in input contributions always induce an equilibrium with positive sabotage which can never be pareto-efficient. Sharing rules that instead put more emphasis on equal sharing lead to an equilibrium where zero sabotage is the optimal equilibrium strategy for all individuals. In the fourth part a model of multiple bilateral conflicts is introduced that are embedded in a network structure. Here, opponents invest in specific conflict technology to attack their respective rivals and defend their own resources. For a general specification of this conflict game there exists a unique equilibrium where each opponent invests positive amounts into conflicts against all its respective rivals. Total conflict intensity, measured as aggregated equilibrium investment into all bilateral conflicts, depends on the underlying network characteristics. We analyze three specific but general classes of conflict structures (represented as regular, star-shaped, and bipartite networks) and show that peaceful resolution of bilateral conflicts, interpreted as dissolving conflictive links, always induces a decrease in conflict intensity for the conflict classes considered. Additionally, a negative relation between individual conflict investment and network centrality can be established for those classes. Extending the analysis to general irregular networks illustrates the limits of this approach because peaceful bilateral conflict resolution might in some cases induce an increase in conflict intensity. The derived results have implications for peaceful resolutions of conflicts because neglecting the fact that opponents are embedded into a interrelated conflict structure might have adverse consequences for conflict intensity.
Datos académicos de la tesis doctoral «Topics in contests theory and experimental evidence«
- Título de la tesis: Topics in contests theory and experimental evidence
- Autor: JÁ¶rg Franke
- Universidad: Autónoma de barcelona
- Fecha de lectura de la tesis: 09/09/2008
Dirección y tribunal
- Director de la tesis
- Carmen Beviá
- Tribunal
- Presidente del tribunal: Luis Corchón díaz
- thomas Palfrey (vocal)
- carmit Segal (vocal)
- wolfgang Leininger (vocal)