Tesis doctoral de Fabio Feriozzi
Managerial incentives ara affected by several elements such as their compensation packages and career concerns, the internal monitoring of the board of directors, the external monitoring of the market for corporate control, etc. This dissertation suggests that it might be necessary to consider their interactions to better understand empirical observations. the first chapter proposes a simle hidden action model which explains recent empirical evidence of asymmetric benchmarking in managerial compensation: management appear to be insulated from bad luck but no from good luck. The explanation hinges on the interaction between explicit contractual incentives and implicit incentives deriving from the possibility of bankruptcy. The second chapter studies how competition in the product market. The third chapter suggests a relationship between increased board independence and increased managerial pay. Captured boards are not active omn the managerial labor market. Therefore, incrased board independence also increases competition for good manager, then risign their pay and making therir career concerns stronger.
Datos académicos de la tesis doctoral «Essays on the economic theory of managerial incentives«
- Título de la tesis: Essays on the economic theory of managerial incentives
- Autor: Fabio Feriozzi
- Universidad: Carlos III de Madrid
- Fecha de lectura de la tesis: 19/12/2007
Dirección y tribunal
- Director de la tesis
- Marco Celentani
- Tribunal
- Presidente del tribunal: Antonio Cabrales goitia
- Francisco Javier Suárez bernaldo de quirós (vocal)
- pablo Casas arce (vocal)
- María Gutierrez urtiaga (vocal)