Tesis doctoral de Saray Ayala López
In my thesis, i defend a particular proposal which describes the current state of modern cognitive science. This proposal challenges the ways in which the mind has been studied so far. I argue that the recently developed field of embodied, situated cognition calls into question the main tenets of classical cognitive science. First, it questions the top-down, three-level explanatory model, then the thesis of the multiple realizability of mental status, and finally, the thesis of the autonomy of special sciences. If my comments are correctly guided, this means that cognitive science is experimenting a shift towards a post-cognitivist era. in the first part of this work, i introduce the main tenets of classical cognitive science. The second part is divided into three chapters where i argue for a particular interpretation of the contributions of the body and the environment, an interpretation that promotes a rupture with those classical tenets. In chapter one i introduce a case where findings in visual research, suggesting the significance of the environment in cognitive processes, have been misinterpreted by some traditional theorists, and so concluded to be evidence in favour of the traditional (computationalist- representationalist) approach. I discuss that research and, contrary to some anti-reductionist arguments, i argue that the fact that we need to broaden the object of study to include the environment does not imply the need for a higher-level of explanation. In chapter two i argue that the proper way to interpret research on the contribution of the body to the mind points towards a non-computationalist understanding of cognition and does not, as is defended by many researchers (e.G. Clark 2006, 2008), confirm the computational nature of cognitive processes. Moreover, i conclude that, as a consequence of this, two critical tenets of traditional cognitive science are called into question: the thesis of the multiply realizable nature of mental states, and the thesis of the autonomy of special sciences, in particular psychology. In chapter three, i denounce the existence of conceptual bias in favour of the traditional computational-representational approach in a particular area, i.E. The vehicles of perceptual experiences. I propose to clarify the debate by first examining the two positions: the narrow substrate thesis and the extended substrate thesis and i argue that this debate is biased in favour of the former, due to the fact that the narrow substrate thesis assumes what is at issue. my conclusion is that the computationalist approach to embodiment and embedment has major flaws, making the radical interpretation an attractive alternative. And it is from the latter interpretation that the move towards post-cognitivism is progressing.
Datos académicos de la tesis doctoral «Philosophy and cognition: lessons from body and environment«
- Título de la tesis: Philosophy and cognition: lessons from body and environment
- Autor: Saray Ayala López
- Universidad: Autónoma de barcelona
- Fecha de lectura de la tesis: 15/07/2011
Dirección y tribunal
- Director de la tesis
- Francisco Jose Calvo Garzon
- Tribunal
- Presidente del tribunal: anna Estany profitós
- Javier Valenzuela manzanares (vocal)
- (vocal)
- (vocal)