Tesis doctoral de Gino Gustavo Loyola Fuentes
This thesis consists of four chapter containing contributions to theory of auctions. the first chapter, «how to sell to buyers with crossholdings», characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings. The central result is that the optimal auction imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders. the second chapter, «optimal takeover contests with toeholds», characterizes how a target firm should be sold when bidders have prioir stakes in its ownership (toeholds). The main finding is that the optimal mechanism needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction which imposes a bias againts buyers with high toeholds. the third chapter, «on bidding markets: the role of competition», analyzes the effects of proceeds. Conditions for (non)monotonicity of both the equilibrium bid and revenue are stated. Our results suggest that the seller may benefit from less competition in markets with more complete valuation and information structures. finallly,the four chapter, «on bidding consortia: the role of information», studies the information effects of legal joint bidding practices (consortia and mergers) on auction outcomes. We conclude that in general the seller benefits from the informational effects driven by bidding arragements.
Datos académicos de la tesis doctoral «Essays on auction theory«
- Título de la tesis: Essays on auction theory
- Autor: Gino Gustavo Loyola Fuentes
- Universidad: Carlos III de Madrid
- Fecha de lectura de la tesis: 22/07/2008
Dirección y tribunal
- Director de la tesis
- María Angeles De Frutos Casado
- Tribunal
- Presidente del tribunal: Antonio Cabrales goitia
- vijay Krishna (vocal)
- Juan José Ganuza fernández (vocal)
- luciano De castro (vocal)